We investigate whether excess control rights of ultimate owners in pyramids affect banks' adjustment to their target capital ratio. When ultimate control rights and cash-flow rights are identical, banks increase their capital ratio by issuing equity and by reshuffling their assets without slowing their lending. However, when control rights exceed cash-flow rights, banks are reluctant to issue equity to increase their capital ratio and, instead, shrink their assets by mainly cutting their lending. A deeper investigation shows that this behavior is only apparent in family-controlled banks and in countries with relatively weak shareholder protection rights.
Introduction
Although banks are more leveraged than nonfinancial firms and are subject to regulatory minimum capital requirements, both theoretical (e.g., Orgler and Taggart, 1983; Myers and Rajan, 1998; Diamond and Rajan, 2000; Allen, Carletti, and Marquez, 2011) and empirical studies (e.g., Marcus, 1983; Flannery and Rangan, 2008) indicate that, like other firms, banks also have a target capital structure. The determinants of banks' capital structure are also found to be similar to those documented for nonfinancial firms (Gropp and Heider, 2011) .
Moreover, minimum capital requirements might not be binding since banks set the target capital ratio well above the regulatory minima (Ayuso, Pérez, and Saurina, 2004; Lindquist, 2004) and as a consequence such regulations might not affect banks' capital ratio adjustment as long as they are not violated (Berger, DeYoung, Flannery, Lee, and Öztekin, 2008) .
However, banks are also known to adjust to their target capital ratio faster than nonfinancial firms (Memmel and Raupach, 2010) . Banks' assets are more liquid and banks can more easily adjust the size of their operations by expanding or shrinking their assets to reach the target capital structure.
In this paper, we question whether the way banks adjust to the target capital structure can be explained by internal governance mechanisms and specifically by excess control rights in pyramidal ownership structures. Excess control rights arise when the controlling shareholder has greater control rights than cash-flow rights.
1 If, under certain conditions, controlling shareholders are more inclined to reap private benefits of control at the expense of minority shareholders, they will strongly value their controlling position. Such controlling shareholders might actually be reluctant to issue new equity that could dilute their private benefits of control. 2 Aversion to losing these benefits, to which we refer to as control dilution, will depend on the extent of such benefits. Extraction of private benefits is known to be easier in pyramids where controlling shareholders can enhance their control and achieve greater divergence between control and cash-flow rights. 3 Such divergence provides the ability and the incentives to extract private benefits of control (e.g., Claessens, Djankov, Fan, and Lang, 2002; Lin, Ma, Malatesta, and Xuan, 2011) . We hence expect the fear of control dilution to be stronger in banks controlled by a shareholder with excess control rights, and as a consequence, such banks might not evenly weigh the way they choose to move towards the target capital ratio. Such banks might be reluctant to (externally) raise equity and would presumably first rely on internal resources when possible. Furthermore, they could move to the target ratio by adjusting their size and/or by reshuffling their assets more promptly than other banks. Specifically, the adjustment process might differently affect bank lending depending on the presence or absence of excess control rights.
To investigate the effect of control dilution, as captured by excess control rights, on banks' adjustment process towards the target, we use a novel and hand-crafted data set on the ultimate ownership structure of 341 commercial banks based in 17 Western European countries 4 between 2002 and 2010. We use a partial adjustment model to estimate a bankspecific and time-varying target capital ratio and to identify the bank's initial position relatively to its target: above or below the target. More specifically, we investigate the various channels that banks rely on when they face a capital ratio shortfall (below the target) or surplus (above the target) to capture possible differences due to the presence of excess control rights. We look into how banks adjust their equity either externally (equity issues /repurchases) or internally (higher/lower earnings retention) and also into how they adjust their assets and particularly their lending. Indeed, in extreme cases banks could simply decrease their capital ratio by extending more loans (funded with new debt) or increase it by selling assets or reducing lending (leading to a lower amount of debt). But banks can also reallocate their assets to reach a different level of risk-weighted assets if they target a regulatory capital ratio such as the Tier1 capital ratio. 5 We find that when control and cash-flow rights are equal, below-target banks adjust their Tier 1 regulatory capital ratio by issuing new equity and by lowering risk-weighted assets (by substituting safer assets to riskier ones) but not by reducing their assets and specifically their loans. When they face a surplus, such banks adjust both externally and internally (by repurchasing equity and lowering earnings retention) and expand their assets and specifically 4 We focus on European countries where the presence of excess control rights is more acute compared to other countries, for instance, the U.S. (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny, 1998) . 5 While the literature on firms' capital structure considers the leverage ratio (debt/equity) or identically the capital ratio (equity/total assets), in the case of banks some broader measure of regulatory capital is generally used. Tier 1 capital is the narrowest definition of regulatory capital in force during our period of study. It is composed of ordinary shares and disclosed reserved (e.g., retained earnings, share premium reserves). It also includes other capital instruments (for example, preferred shares, hybrid capital securities) which will no more be eligible under the Basel III Accords (BIS, 2010a) . their lending. However, when control rights exceed cash-flow rights, while they do repurchase equity when they face a surplus, banks are reluctant to issue any equity when they face a shortfall. In the latter case, banks not only draw on earnings to reach the target capital ratio but also shrink their assets in general and their lending in particular. This finding is consistent with our prediction that controlling shareholders with excess control rights fear dilution of control that may arise from equity issuance. As a consequence, external recapitalization is limited and banks rely on internal funds but also on downsizing.
We also take our investigation further and analyze whether the type of the largest ultimate controlling shareholder, the level of shareholder protection rights and the 2008 global financial crisis affect the impact of excess control rights on banks' capital ratio adjustment.
Consistent with the view that family ownership (Claessens, Djankov, Fan, and Lang, 2002; Almeida and Wolfenzon, 2006; Villalonga and Amit, 2006) as well as weak shareholder protection rights (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny, 2002; Dyck and Zingales, 2004) increase the incentives of controlling shareholders to extract private benefits of control, we find that the impact of excess control rights is only effective for family-owned banks or banks operating in countries with relatively weak shareholder protection. Instead of issuing equity to move to the target capital ratio, such banks distribute less dividends and cut their assets including their loans. Moreover, we show that during the 2008 financial crisis banks controlled by a shareholder with excess control rights did issue -just like any other bankequity to adjust to the target instead of cutting their assets and specifically their lending. This is consistent with the view that ultimate controlling owners who expect to divert higher resources in the future might provide significant support to their firms during a crisis (Friedman, Johnson, and Mitton, 2003) .
Our paper makes two main contributions to the capital structure adjustment and corporate governance literature. First, we build a bridge between the two strands of the literature by exploring the effect of control rights of the bank's ultimate owner in pyramids on capital structure adjustment. We investigate differences in the adjustment process towards the target capital ratio and particularly whether banks are reluctant to raise (external) equity and possibly limit their size and especially their lending in the presence of excess control rights of the bank's ultimate owner. Admati, DeMarzo, Hellwig, and Pfleiderer (2010) argue that banks would only limit their lending if issuing equity is more costly because of frictions and governance problems. Consistently, in our work, we show that banks do actually not refrain from lending except when control rights exceed cash-flow rights under very specific conditions. In the absence of excess control rights, banks do issue equity without slowing their lending to increase their capital ratio. By linking ownership structure to bank lending, our paper also contributes to the literature investigating the effect of foreign and domestic ownership on lending stability (e.g., Claessens and Van Horen (2013a, b) showing that foreign banks contributed to financial instability by strongly reducing their lending compared to domestic banks during the 2008 financial crisis). 6 We also add to the literature investigating asymmetries and/or cross-variations in the adjustment speed with which firms converge to the optimal capital structure (e.g., Byoun, 2008; Öztekin and Flannery, 2012; and more specifically Berger, DeYoung, Flannery, Lee, and Öztekin, 2008; Memmel and Raupach, 2010 for banks). Our study further contributes to the literature exploring the driving factors behind the reluctance of firms to recapitalize (e.g., Dittmar and Thakor (2007) who
show that firms dislike raising equity if they expect disagreement on investment decisions
with new investors). Second, unlike previous studies on pyramidal ownership structure (see, e.g., La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer, 1999; Claessens, Djankov, and Lang, 2000 and Faccio and Lang, 2002 for nonfinancial firms, and Caprio, Laeven, and Levine, 2007 and Laeven and Levine, 2009 for banks) which typically focus on the largest publicly traded corporations at a given point in time, we gather a broader and more detailed database on ultimate ownership structure including large and small institutions, both publicly traded and privately owned for three different years of the sample period (2004, 2006 and 2010) to check for possible changes in the ultimate ownership structure, especially after the 2008 financial crisis.
Our study also contributes to the debate on the post-crisis bank regulatory framework and more specifically on the new standards for capital regulation. The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BIS, 2010a) has implemented new rules not only to strengthen the existing capital requirements but also to improve the quality of regulatory capital by excluding preferred shares, which in general do not carry control rights, from the new and narrower definition called Core Tier 1 capital. Such requirements might entail high costs for controlling shareholders with excess control rights which, according to our findings, could encourage banks not to issue common equity to adjust closer to their target capital ratio.
Rather, our results show that such controlled banks will adjust by reducing their size and 6 Other studies investigate whether the implementation of the risk-based capital requirements had an impact on bank lending and show that the severity of the 1990-1992 credit crunch in the U.S. can be explained by the introduction of more stringent capital rules (e.g., Berger and Udell, 1994; Peek and Rosengren, 1995; Brinkmann and Horvitz, 1995) .
notably their lending activities, and potentially their overall contribution to the real economy.
Our work also addresses the concerns of the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BIS, 2010b) highlighting the relevance of sound corporate governance in the banking industry and recommending the disclosure of banking entities' ownership.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes the data, defines the ultimate ownership variables and provides some statistics. In Section 3, we specify the model we use to conduct our empirical investigation. Section 4 provides estimation results and Section 5 shows robustness checks. Section 6 concludes the paper and provides some policy implications.
Data and ultimate ownership variables
We start by describing our sample and then present the procedure we follow to measure excess control rights as well as the characteristics of the computed ownership variables.
Sample
Our study spans the 2002-2010 period and focuses on commercial banks established in 17 We restrict our sample to institutions actually involved in lending by requiring the bank to have a loans to total assets ratio above 10%. 8 After eliminating extreme bank year 7 Note that our empirical analysis relies to a large extent on unconsolidated bank statements. In some cases, Bankscope provides information for the Tier 1 capital ratio only for consolidated data. We check the robustness of our results using unconsolidated data solely. 8 Bankscope defines as commercial banks institutions that are mainly active in a combination of retail banking, wholesale banking and private banking. This broad definition implies that some banks considered as commercial banks exhibit a very low loans to total assets ratio. Since our aim is to analyze banks' lending behavior, we need to further restrict our sample.
observations for the main variables (1% lowest and highest values) and 28 banks for which we are not able to identify the ultimate controlling owners, we are left with a final sample of 2,204 annual observations corresponding to 341 commercial banks, 111 of which are listed (see Table A1 in Appendix A for a breakdown of these banks by country and Table A2 for general descriptive statistics). To gauge the representativeness of our sample, we compare the aggregate total assets of our sample banks in a given country to the aggregate total assets of all the banks covered by Bankscope in the same country over the 2002-2010 period (see Table   A1 in Appendix A). On average, our final sample covers more than 78% of banks' total assets in the considered countries.
Building of control chains and ultimate ownership variables
To measure the ultimate owner's excess control rights, we first need to build the control chains to identify the ultimate controlling owners for each bank. Although prior studies (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer, 1999; Caprio, Laeven, and Levine, 2007; Laeven and Levine, 2008, 2009) To build the control chains, we need to define a threshold (minimum percentage of shares held) to identify each owner along the chain. Following previous studies on both banks (Caprio, Laeven, and Levine, 2007; Laeven and Levine, 2009 ) and nonfinancial firms (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer, 1999; Laeven and Levine, 2008) , we use a control threshold of 10% assuming that it provides a significant fraction of votes for effective control.
We first identify the major shareholders (those holding at least 10% of the shares) of each bank by gathering data on direct ownership from Bankscope using DVDs issued in 2004,
2006 and 2010 and complete it with information from annual reports disclosed in the banks' web sites. We classify a bank as controlled if it has at least one shareholder with 10% or more of total outstanding shares. Otherwise, we consider the bank to be widely held. Substantial divergence between voting and cash-flow rights may exist in the presence of 11 Given a control threshold of 10%, the maximum number of controlling shareholders at each level of the bank's control chain is equal to ten. If n stands for the number of levels in the control chain, the maximum number of ultimate controlling owners for a control threshold of 10% is 10 n . In our sample, the maximum number of intermediate levels necessary to trace the indirect control chain until the ultimate owner is eight. The number of different ultimate controlling owners for a given bank in our sample also reaches a maximum of eight. 12 Over the 2002-2010 period, among the set of controlled banks in our sample, 223 are continuously classified as controlled by a single ultimate owner and 60 are continuously classified as controlled by multiple ultimate owners while 32 banks switch from one category to the other. 13 A bank's control chain is a cross-holding at the 10% threshold if a corporation holds a stake of at least 10% in the bank which in turn holds a stake of at least 10% in that corporation. indirect control chains.
14 We define excess control rights as the difference between voting and cash-flow rights (ExcessControl=ControlRights-Cash-flowRights) as in La Porta, Lopez-deSilanes, and Shleifer (1999 whereas the aggregate cash-flow rights are 40.6% (0.6+40). The difference between both aggregate rights (excess control rights) of C6 is equal to 29.4% (70 -40.6).
[Insert Fig. 1 about here]
Ultimate ownership characteristics and financial profiles of the sample banks
Our data set indicates that 83% of the observations refer to banks controlled by at least one 14 The divergence between voting and cash-flow rights may arise from both indirect control chains (pyramids and multiple holdings) and dual class shares. Bankscope and Amadeus measure ownership using the voting rights and do not provide information on cash-flow rights. Given the information we have and in line with previous literature (Caprio, Laeven, and Levine, 2007; Laeven and Levine 2009) , we consider the divergence between voting and cash-flow rights stemming from indirect control chains. We do not view this as a serious shortcoming for our study as previous studies (Claessens, Djankov, Fan, and Lang, 2002; Faccio and Lang, 2002; Azofra and Santamaría, 2011) show that the use of dual class shares is relatively scarce. 15 Ownership structure and particularly the divergence between voting and cash-flow rights can to some extent change over time; accordingly, the classification of banks as without or with excess control rights might also change. Amongst the 341 banks in our sample, 195 are continuously categorized as without excess control rights and 113 as with excess control rights while 33 banks switch from one category to the other over the sample period. 16 In our sample, the difference between both rights (ExcessControl) is generally relatively high. It is lower than 10% only in the case of five banks and we classify them as banks with excess control rights.
ultimate shareholder. Amongst banks that are controlled, 57% of the observations relate to an ultimate shareholder with equal control and cash-flow rights and 43% to an ultimate shareholder with excess control rights. This sample composition allows us to accurately conduct our empirical investigation.
We report in Table 1 shareholder holds on average more than 80% of the voting rights and only around 36% of the cash-flow rights. This leads to an average divergence between voting rights and cash-flow rights of almost 44%. As cash-flow rights are more than two times lower than voting rights, the ultimate controlling shareholder would be more inclined to extract private benefits and, in turn, to protect his voting rights rather than his cash-flow rights. Table 2 reports information on the type of the largest ultimate controlling owner. It shows differences for banks without or with excess control rights. For banks without excess control rights, the largest ultimate controlling owner is predominantly (almost 42% of the observations) another bank (Bank). This proportion is more than two times lower for banks with excess control rights (more than 17% of the observations). This is consistent with the view that banks, when they are controlling shareholders, are less likely to engage in expropriation as the resulting benefits are distributed among multiple owners and also because regulation, when stringently enforced, makes expropriation more costly (Villalonga and Amit, 2006; Haw, Ho, Hu, and Wu, 2010 Table 1 . 18 We follow La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer (1999) by classifying a bank as family controlled if the controlling shareholder is a person. We therefore include banks that are controlled by a manager inside this category. Note that in our sample only six banks are controlled by managers, four of which are banks with excess control rights. 19 The proportion of state ownership in the full sample (10.03%) is higher than in previous studies (Faccio and Lang, 2002; Caprio, Laeven, and Levine, 2007) . This is because we consider not only large and publicly traded banks but also small and privately owned banks and because of the outcome of the 2008 financial crisis with massive government intervention either by capital injections and/or by nationalizations. Before the crisis (2002) (2003) (2004) (2005) (2006) , state ownership represents 4.72% of the observations in the sample of 341 banks, which is almost similar to what is reported in previous studies (Faccio and Lang, 2002; Caprio, Laeven, and Levine, 2007) .
excess control rights (around 30% and 22% of the observations respectively). However, they are less present in banks without excess control rights (about 15% and 3% of the observations respectively). The divergence between both rights could enable ultimate controlling owners, and especially families, to expropriate minority shareholders and divert a larger fraction of resources (Claessens, Djankov, Fan, and Lang, 2002; Almeida and Wolfenzon, 2006) .
Institutional investors (Institutional) and industrial companies (Industry) are also more frequently present as ultimate controlling shareholders in banks with excess control rights (around 16% and 9% of the observations respectively) than in banks without excess control rights (nearly 8% and 2% of the observations respectively). Foundations (Foundation) are quite evenly distributed between the two subsamples of banks without and with excess control rights, with a much weaker presence as shareholders in both cases. Table 2 also reports the extent of widely held banks and cross-holdings in the subsample of banks without excess control rights. They respectively represent about 24% and 2% of the observations. Table 3 compares the summary statistics on key financial variables for the subsamples of banks without and with excess control rights. Banks with excess control rights rely more on traditional intermediation activities (higher loans to total assets ratio). In line with the expropriation hypothesis of pyramidal ownership structure (Claessens, Djankov, Fan, and Lang, 2002; Azofra and Santamaría, 2011) , they have poorer loan quality (higher proportion of non-performing loans) and are less profitable (lower return on assets and return on equity).
The table also shows that banks with excess control rights hold lower Tier 1 capital ratios (either risk-based or not), possibly because of the fear of control dilution. Furthermore, banks with excess control rights are less likely to pay dividends, presumably to more easily increase their capital ratios via internal funds or because of the effect of expropriation (Faccio, Lang, and Young, 2001 ).
[Insert Tables 1, 2 and 3 about here] We now move to the approach we follow to investigate the impact of excess control rights on the bank's adjustment process towards the target capital ratio.
Methodology
In this paper, we question whether the way banks adjust their capital ratio towards the target level is affected by the ultimate owner's excess control rights. Banks have two options that can be combined to reach their target capital ratio: they can adjust the numerator (equity issues/repurchases and/or earnings retention) and/or the denominator (assets adjustment and/or risk-weighted assets) of their capital ratio. Depending on their control/ownership pattern, banks might not uniformly weigh these different adjustment options. Specifically, banks controlled by a shareholder with excess control rights might be reluctant to issue equity since external recapitalization can lead to control dilution. Instead, such banks are likely to increase retained earnings and/or decrease their size (loans or other assets) or risk-weighted assets (asset substitution) when they need to increase their capital ratio.
Our approach involves two steps. We first consider a partial adjustment model to estimate a bank-specific and time-varying target capital ratio and the gap between the target and the lagged actual capital ratios. We then investigate how banks increase or decrease their capital ratio to adjust to the target by modifying their regulatory capital (numerator) and/or assets (denominator) depending on their controlling owners' excess control rights.
Estimating the target capital ratio and computing deviations from the target
We model the target capital ratio as a function of the bank's and country's characteristics (e.g., Marcus, 1983; Gropp and Heider, 2011) as follows: 20 In this study, we focus exclusively on the Tier 1 capital ratio (risk-based or nonrisk-based) and ignore the total capital ratio. Tier 1 capital is mainly composed of ordinary shares. Tier 2 capital does not involve voting rights and therefore the fear of control dilution might not be observed in changes in the total regulatory capital (Tier 1 + Tier 2). 21 To capture excess control rights, we define a dummy variable ExcessCR which is equal to one if the voting rights are greater than the cash-flow rights, and zero otherwise. We use a binary variable which we consider to be more accurate than a continuous variable in our specific setting: (i) a binary variable is more likely to be independent of the method used to compute indirect control rights, the last link principle (e.g., La Porta, Lopezde-Silanes, and Shleifer, 1999; Azofra and Santamaría, 2011) or the weakest link principle method (e.g., Claessens, Djankov, and Lang, 2000; Lin, Ma, Malatesta, and Xuan, 2011) ; phrased differently, qualitatively, the two available methods would give the same classification (a bank with or without excess control rights) but quantitatively the computed excess control rights can be very different with the two methods; (ii) we have not collected ownership data on a continuous basis (every year), a binary variable is more likely to remain stable over time; (iii) we do not account for excess control rights that may arise from the existence of dual class shares; (vi) in our sample, the difference between both rights is generally relatively high; it is lower than 10% only in the case of five banks. 22 We include the dummy variable ExcessCR because, on average, banks without excess control rights exhibit higher Tier 1 capital ratios than banks with excess control rights (see Table 3 ). Our specification is hence flexible enough to account for possible differences in the target capital ratio for banks with or without excess control rights.
loss provisions (LoanlossProv), the ratio of net loans to total assets (Loans), the ratio of long term market funding to total funding as a proxy of market discipline (MarketDiscipline) and a dummy variable for listed banks (Listed); GDPGrowth is the annual growth rate of real GDP for country c (see Table A3 in Appendix A for a description of these variables and summary statistics). 23 Time-varying explanatory variables are lagged by one year to avoid simultaneity.
Country and Year are respectively vectors of country and year dummies. is a vector of bank fixed effects.
The model specified in Eq. (1) assumes that banks will always maintain their capital ratio at its target level. This is only possible in a frictionless world. In practice, banks need time to adjust their capital and their assets to modify their capital ratio and move to the target level.
Hence, to account for adjustment costs, we consider a partial adjustment framework (Eq. (2)) where banks adjust a constant portion ( is a scalar adjustment speed, [ ] with higher values of indicating faster adjustment) of the gap between the target and the lagged actual capital ratios:
Substituting Eq. (1) into Eq. (2) and rearranging gives the following estimation model:
We use the average adjustment speed ( ̂) and the vector of coefficients 24 obtained from estimating Eq. (3) to compute a fitted value of the target Tier 1 capital ratio 25 for each bank every year ( ̂ ). This bank-specific and time-varying estimated target capital ratio is then used to compute the gap (Gap it-1 ) between the estimated target capital ratio ( ̂ ) and the lagged actual capital ratio ( ) as follows:
23 On the whole, the correlations among the explanatory variables used to estimate the target capital ratio are low. 24 We estimate Eq. (3) using the Blundell and Bond (1998) Generalized Method of Moments (GMM). The results are reported in Table A4 in Appendix A. As shown in Table A4 , the coefficients estimates are generally significant and their signs are, on the whole, consistent with previous studies (see Table A3 in Appendix A for the expected signs).
25 Note that the coefficients obtained from estimating Eq. (3) are the product of the adjustment speed ( ) and the variable's contribution to the bank's target capital ratio. Hence, to get the parameter value of the contribution of each variable we divide the estimated regression coefficient for that variable by the adjustment speed . The estimated values of the target capital ratio are computed from Eq. (1) as follows:
Our objective is to test whether banks controlled by a shareholder with excess control rights are reluctant to raise equity and therefore downsize by possibly refraining from lending. We hence separate the cases where banks are above the target (kSurplus) and below the target (kDeficit) and for easier interpretation of the results we consider the absolute value of the gap (Gap it-1 ): When the lagged actual capital ratio is above the target level, the bank faces a capital ratio surplus (kSurplus). In this case, the bank can adjust towards the target capital ratio by (i) decreasing its capital (equity repurchase and/or lower earnings retention) or (ii) expanding its assets (by lending more and/or investing in other assets) or its risk-weighted assets. When the lagged actual capital ratio is below the target level, the bank faces a shortfall (kDeficit). In such a case, to move to the target level, it needs to (i) increase its capital (by issuing new equity and/or limiting dividend distribution) or (ii) reduce its assets (by shrinking lending and/or other assets) or its risk-weighted assets.
Excess control rights and adjustments towards the target capital ratio
Our aim is to investigate how banks respond to a capital ratio deficit or surplus when they are controlled by a shareholder with equal control and cash-flow rights or by a shareholder with excess control rights.
Banks can change their capital (thereafter referred to as capital adjustment) either externally by issuing/repurchasing equity or internally by distributing lower or larger amounts of earnings. 26 Differentiating between external and internal changes in capital is important to test whether banks controlled by a shareholder with excess control rights are reluctant to issue equity when they are below their target capital ratio. As a proxy for the level of capital, we use the Tier 1 regulatory capital. We hence define external change in capital (denoted thereafter Tier1) as the annual change in the level of Tier 1 capital minus the amount of retained earnings, all scaled by average assets defined as: (total assets at time t + total assets at time t-1)/2. Internal change in capital (thereafter RetainedEarnings) is measured by the amount of retained earnings scaled by average assets. Banks can also adjust their assets to move closer to the target capital ratio. We capture such adjustments (thereafter referred to as assets adjustment) using the annual change (scaled by average assets) in the following outcomes: total assets, net loans (excluding interbank loans) and risk-weighted assets, denoted thereafter Assets, Loans and RWA respectively. We hence specify the following dynamic model:
where y is the dependent variable which accounts either for capital adjustment (Tier1, RetainedEarnings) or assets adjustment (Assets, Loans or RWA); kSurplus and kDeficit refer to the absolute value of the gap between the target and the lagged actual ratios when the bank is above or below the target level respectively; ExcessCR is a dummy variable capturing the presence of excess control rights; Z and V are respectively vectors of bank-and countrylevel control variables. The parameters and refer to banks without excess control rights (ExcessCR=0). They measure the extent to which capital and assets are modified by such banks to adjust to the target capital ratio downwards (kSurplus) and upwards (kDeficit) respectively. As argued above, banks without excess control rights might indifferently adjust their capital ratio upwards and downwards because their ultimate controlling owners do not fear control 27 See Table A5 in Appendix A for the definition and the descriptive statistics for the variables used to estimate Eq. (6). The correlations among the main explanatory variables (Z and V) are generally very low.
dilution. When they are below their target, we expect these banks to increase their capital internally and externally without strongly reducing their loans and other assets: positive and significant for capital adjustment variables and non-significant or significant and negative for assets adjustment variables. When they are above the target, they are expected to decrease their capital internally and externally to temper asset expansion ( negative and significant for capital adjustment variables and non-significant for assets adjustment variables) and/or increase their assets ( significant and positive for assets adjustment variables).
The parameters and refer to banks with excess control rights (ExcessCR=1) and respectively correspond to the proportion of capital and assets used to adjust the capital ratio downwards (kSurplus) and upwards (kDeficit). When they are below their target, banks with excess control rights are expected to be reluctant to issue equity ( significant and negative for Tier1). In the extreme case, such banks might not be issuing equity at all (if the sum is not significantly different from zero). Such banks might increase their retained earnings and/or shrink their assets (loans or other assets). We hence expect the sum to be significantly positive with regards to earnings retention (RetainedEarnings) and significantly negative for assets adjustment variables (Assets, Loans and RWA), indicating that such banks counterbalance their reluctance to raise equity by increasing retained earnings and/or deleveraging. When they are above their target, because control dilution is not an issue, such banks are expected to behave similarly to banks without excess control rights ( significant for Tier1 and significant or non-significant for RetainedEarnings, Assets, Loans and RWA).
Results
We first investigate the link between excess control rights and the bank's capital ratio adjustment and then look at various factors that could influence such a relationship.
Effect of excess control rights on adjustments towards the target capital ratio
In this study, we aim to test for differences in banks' responses to deviations from their target capital ratio depending on the presence or absence of excess control rights.
We estimate the coefficients of the dynamic panel model presented in Eq. (6) Based on the results in Table 4 , 28 banks controlled by a shareholder with equal control and cash-flow rights respond to a capital ratio surplus (kSurplus) by both reducing capital and expanding assets. The decrease in capital is achieved both externally (equity repurchase) and internally (reduction in earnings retention): is negative and significant for Tier1 and
RetainedEarnings. Such banks expand their assets, in particular their lending, and increase their risk-weighted assets by substituting riskier assets to safer ones ( positive and significant for Assets, Loans and RWA). When they face a capital ratio shortfall (kDeficit), such banks converge to the target by issuing new equity ( positive and significant for Tier1). Such banks do not increase their capital internally but most importantly they do not decrease their assets and particularly their lending ( nonsignificant for RetainedEarnings, Assets and Loans) although they do to some extent reshuffle their assets as shown by the results with the risk-based Tier 1 ratio (Tier1RWA). On the whole, these results suggest that the ultimate controlling owners of such banks do not fear control dilution and increase their capital ratio by issuing equity without reducing their assets and particularly their lending.
When they are above their target capital ratio, banks controlled by a shareholder with excess control rights are found to decrease their capital through equity repurchases ( significant for Tier1) but they do not expand their assets by increasing their lending and do not reshuffle their assets ( non-significant for Assets, Loans and RWA). When such banks are below their target, conversely to banks with equal control and cash-flow rights, they do not issue equity ( significant and non-significant for Tier1)
which is consistent with our conjecture that ultimate owners with excess control rights fear control dilution. Alternatively, these banks adopt other adjustment methods to preserve the control power of the ultimate owners: they counterbalance their reluctance to issue new equity by increasing their capital internally ( positive and significant for RetainedEarnings) but also by shrinking/reshuffling their assets and particularly their loans ( negative and significant for Assets, Loans and RWA).
Our results are not only statistically significant but also economically meaningful. A one standard deviation (2.61) increase in the capital ratio shortfall leads to a decrease in Loans by 28% of its mean (corresponding to a strong deceleration in loan growth) for banks with excess control rights but does not affect loan growth for banks without excess control rights.
A one standard deviation (2.35) increase in the capital ratio surplus is associated with a 19% increase in Loans, a 23% decrease in Tier1 and a 21% decrease in RetainedEarnings (of their means) for banks without excess control rights. For banks with excess control rights such a change in the capital ratio surplus is only associated with a decrease in Tier1 by 29% of its mean.
[Insert Table 4 about here]
On the whole, our results show that banks adjust to their target capital ratio differently when they are controlled by a shareholder without or with excess control rights. Particularly, banks with excess control rights do not raise equity to adjust to the target. Instead, they rely on earnings retention and sharply reduce their expansion, particularly in lending. Our findings also show that banks without excess control rights adjust to the target -by issuing equitywithout slowing their lending activities. Our results are consistent with Admati, DeMarzo, Hellwig, and Pfleiderer (2010) who argue that banks should be able to expand their lending even if they had to increase their regulatory capital as long as there is no reluctance to issue equity due to specific governance arrangements within the bank. Our findings show that such reluctance is possible and can effectively affect lending for a large number of banks in Europe.
We now go further by analyzing the conditions under which the fear of control dilution is more or less pronounced with possibly stronger implications.
Factors affecting the link between excess control rights and capital ratio adjustment
Our main results support the conjecture that the ultimate controlling shareholders with excess control rights avoid issuing equity and instead draw on earnings and decrease their assets and particularly their loans to increase the capital ratio, possibly to preserve their control power. To take our investigation further, we consider some factors that might strengthen or weaken the relationship between excess control rights and the bank's adjustment process towards the target: (i) the type of the largest ultimate controlling shareholder, (ii) the level of shareholder protection rights, and (iii) the 2008 global financial crisis. 
Largest ultimate controlling owner type
Incentives to extract private benefits of control can vary across different types of controlling shareholders. As argued by Villalonga and Amit (2006) , if the controlling shareholder is a widely held institution (bank, industrial firm, mutual fund and so on), the private benefits of control are diluted among multiple owners and as a consequence, the incentives to expropriate are weak. If, however, the controlling shareholder is a family or a state, the incentives for expropriation might be stronger since families and the state are more able to efficiently divert benefits to themselves. 30 Thus, we examine whether the reluctance to raise equity and the reliance on earnings retention and assets downsizing are more pronounced for particular types of ultimate controlling owners.
For this purpose, we classify banks into three categories depending on their ownership type:
family-(Family) and state-controlled (State) banks and the category Other which is the removed category in our model. 31 The estimation results are presented in Table 5 . Our previous result indicating that banks with excess control rights do not increase their Tier 1 capital and, instead, draw on earnings and shrink their assets by mainly cutting their lending, only holds for family-controlled banks. When they are controlled by a state, banks with excess control rights are not found to be reluctant to issue new equity. In our sample, a large part of state ownership comes from government intervention (capital injection and nationalizations) during the 2008 financial crisis which might explain our result. 29 In this section, we estimate this equation:
where Factor stands for one of the three variables that are expected to affect the relationship between excess control rights and the adjustment process towards the target capital ratio. 30 For instance, Claessens, Djankov, Fan, and Lang (2002) find that excess control rights are associated with discounts in family-and state-controlled corporations' value (although the effect is very weak in state-owned firms), but this relation is not significant when the controlling shareholder is a widely held institution. Lin, Ma, Malatesta, and Xuan (2011) find that the positive link between excess control rights and the cost of bank loans is stronger for family-owned firms and weaker for state-owned ones. Cronqvist and Nilsson (2005) find that family-controlled firms avoid equity issuing methods that could dilute their control benefits or impose more monitoring on them. 31 The category Other includes widely held banks (with no controlling shareholder) and banks controlled by a widely held financial or nonfinancial corporation. This classification is reasonable because banks controlled by a widely held financial or nonfinancial corporation can be classified as widely held themselves (Caprio, Laeven, and Levine, 2007) . For simplicity, we also remove banks for which the control chain is a cross-holding (five banks corresponding to 33 observations) since we can neither classify them as widely held banks nor as controlled banks.
Shareholder protection rights
As expropriation is more likely to occur in countries with weak shareholder protection rights (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny, 2002; Dyck and Zingales, 2004) , we conjecture that the largest controlling shareholder with excess control rights might be more reluctant to raise external equity and, instead, will rely more on internal and assets adjustments in these countries. This is because (i) control in such countries is more valuable for the controlling owner as he can divert significant resources and (ii) the fear of becoming a minority shareholder and, in turn, being subject to expropriation, is stronger.
To represent the level of shareholder protection, we use the anti-director index as calculated in Djankov, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer (2008) . 32 In our sample, the index has a median of two and half and ranges from one (Luxembourg) with the weakest protection to five (Spain and the United Kingdom) with the highest level of shareholder protection. We define a dummy variable ShareRight that takes the value of one if the shareholder protection index in a given country is greater than the cross-country median value, and zero otherwise.
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The estimation results are presented in Table 6 . They show that banks with excess control rights significantly adjust their Tier 1 capital upwards when they are located in a country with strong shareholder protection. But such banks do not at all adjust by issuing equity when they are established in countries with weak shareholder protection rights. Instead, these banks significantly draw on their earnings and decrease their assets (particularly their loans) to adjust their capital ratio upwards. This result is consistent with our prediction: a higher level of shareholder protection rights tempers the fear of control dilution of the controlling shareholders with excess control rights. In countries with strong shareholder rights, banks with excess control rights do externally adjust their Tier 1 capital ratio upwards and do not rely considerably on earnings retention and downsizing.
32 This index is obtained by adding one when: (1) shareholders are allowed to mail in their proxy votes to the firm; (2) shareholders are not required to deposits hares before any general shareholders' meeting; (3) cumulative voting or proportional representation of minorities in the board is allowed; (4) minority shareholders have legal mechanisms against perceived oppression by the board; (5) the minimum percentage of share capital that entitles a shareholder to call for a special shareholders' meeting is no more than 10%; or (6) shareholders have preemptive rights that can be waived only by a shareholders' vote. Although this index has been constructed at the country level from rules in place for publicly listed firms, similar disclosure requirements, approval procedure and facilitation of private litigation are used by owners of privately owned firms to deter managerial misconduct. 33 We are concerned by potential endogeneity between family/state ownership and the level of shareholder protection and therefore we check the prevalence of state and family ownership in countries with weak and strong shareholder protection. The proportion of observations for banks with excess control rights that have a family or a state as an ultimate controlling owner and that are below their target level is 44% in countries with relatively weak shareholder protection rights and 38% in countries with relatively strong rights.
Financial crisis
The Table 7 . They show that banks with excess control rights do not issue any equity to adjust their Tier 1 ratio upwards during normal times. They rather increase their capital ratio by drawing on earnings and by shrinking their assets and particularly their loans. However, during the 2008 financial crisis these banks significantly increased their Tier 1 capital and they apparently did not draw on earnings or decrease their assets by cutting their loans to adjust their ratio upwards. This suggests that during the crisis, banks with excess control rights increased the use of external capital to adjust upwards for at least one of the reasons discussed above (propping up behavior and/or market/supervisory discipline) and as a consequence their reliance on other adjustment methods (earnings retention and assets adjustment) is no longer significant.
In summary (see Table 8 for an overview of our results), the results show that the presence of excess control rights actually affects the way banks adjust towards the target capital ratio.
When they are below the target, banks without excess control rights are found to adjust by issuing equity and by reshuffling their assets without slowing their lending and other activities. When they are above the target, such banks decrease their Tier 1 capital both 34 Friedman, Johnson, and Mitton (2003) define propping up (transfer of funds to the firm) as a negative tunneling behavior (with tunneling defined as a transfer of funds out of the firm) and assumes that the propensity to tunnel is highly correlated with the propensity to prop up, namely that, firms that are likely to be subject to tunneling during upturns are also likely to be propped up during downturns. The reason behind the propping up behavior is that earnings in the future, especially from profit diversion, are valuable for the controlling shareholders and they therefore aim to keep such firms in business and avoid their failure. This allows them to exploit such opportunities in the future. 
Robustness checks
We perform several regressions to check the robustness of our results 37 obtained in Sections 36 Our data indicate that banks with excess control rights are frequent in Europe; they represent around 48% of the controlled-banks. These banks are more focused on traditional intermediation activities (loans), and contribute up to 50% of the total loans granted to the economy as a whole. 37 For each of our robustness checks, we re-estimate the target capital ratio to compute the estimated values of the capital ratio surplus (kSurplus) and shortfall (kDeficit). The results, not reported here but available on request, are almost similar to those obtained in Table A4 in Appendix A. 38 Note that in all the tables, we only report the results obtained for the variables of interest. Detailed results are available on request.
for Section 4.1.
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To test the robustness of our results, we run regressions on two distinct subsamples to differentiate banks without and with excess control rights instead of using interaction terms as in Eq. (6). This check leads to similar findings (see Table B1 in Appendix B).
The period covered by our sample is limited by the availability of data on ownership in
Bankscope and Amadeus (9 years). This might limit the effectiveness of a dynamic estimation procedure, namely, the use of a partial capital adjustment model as specified in Eq. (3).
Hence, we test the robustness of our results by estimating the values of the target capital ratio using a perfect capital adjustment model as specified in Eq. (1). 40 This check leaves our main conclusions unchanged (see Panel 1 of Table B2 in Appendix B).
We further exclude from the initial sample banks controlled by more than one large ultimate shareholder (corresponding to 499 observations). The ability and the incentives of a controlling shareholder to expropriate and thus to protect his position might be different in the absence or presence of multiple controlling shareholders. The second largest shareholder could monitor the largest one and impede his tendency to extract private benefits of control.
In such a case, the reluctance of the largest shareholder to issue equity (to protect his controlling power) and his reliance on internal funds and downsizing might be less of a concern. If, however, the second largest shareholder colludes with the largest one to form a coalition and render expropriation more efficient (Bennedsen and Wolfenzon, 2000; Maury and Pajuste, 2005; Laeven and Levine, 2008) , the reluctance to issue new equity and the reliance on internal funds and downsizing to adjust to the target capital ratio might be more pronounced. This check leads again to similar findings (see Panel 2 of Table B2 in Appendix B).
Since banks from Italy account for more than one third of the sample (this corresponds to 678 observations), we run regressions without Italian banks and obtain almost similar results (see Panel 1 of Table B3 in Appendix B).
We finally increase the control threshold and recalculate ownership variables with a control level of 20% instead of 10%. This new minimum control threshold changes our database both 39 The robustness checks on factors affecting the relationship between the excess control rights and the adjustment process towards the target (Section 4.2) lead to similar conclusions and are available on request. 40 The Hausman test fails to reject the null hypothesis of the exogeneity of the regressors of Eq. (1). Hence, we estimate this equation using Generalized Least Square estimator (GLS) with robust standards errors.
quantitatively and qualitatively 41 but our main conclusions are unchanged (see Panel 2 of Table B3 in Appendix B).
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Conclusion and policy implications
The aim of this study is to empirically test whether the divergence between control and cash-flow rights influences banks' capital ratio adjustment behavior. For this purpose, we assemble a novel hand-collected data set on bank ultimate control and ownership structure and work on an unbalanced panel of 341 commercial banks across 17 European countries from 2002 to 2010.
On the whole, the results confirm the conjecture that the bank's decision on how to move to the target capital ratio is different in the presence or absence of excess control rights. On the one hand, when there is no divergence between both rights, we find that banks increase their capital ratio mainly by issuing equity and without slowing their lending activities. Such banks reduce their capital ratio by repurchasing equity (and distributing more dividends) but also by expanding their assets and particularly their lending. In such a case, there appears to be no fear of control dilution of the ultimate controlling shareholders. On the other hand, in the presence of excess control rights, banks are reluctant to issue equity to reach the target but more inclined to repurchase equity when they are above the target. Moreover, such banks are found to counterbalance their reluctance to issue equity by using internal resources and by shrinking their assets and particularly their lending. Furthermore, instead of expanding their assets when they have more equity capital than needed, they adjust by exclusively repurchasing equity. Our findings suggest that the ultimate controlling shareholders with excess control rights curb recapitalization to preserve their controlling position. Further investigation shows that such reluctance to issue new equity -in the presence of excess control rights-and the reliance on internal funds and downsizing to adjust to the target capital ratio hold only if the ultimate controlling shareholder is a family or when the bank is headquartered in a country with weak shareholder protection. However, such behavior was not apparent during the 2008 financial crisis: to move towards their target ratio such banks raised equity without reducing their assets and particularly their lending. 41 With a threshold of 20% instead of 10%, our database comprises a higher proportion of banks considered as widely held and of banks controlled by another bank. The proportion of family-and state-owned banks is lower. More details on how our ownership variables are affected by increasing the control threshold from 10% to 20% are available on request. 42 Note that we also check the robustness of our results by performing further estimations using this new control threshold (20%). We run all the checks performed with the data set based on a 10% threshold. In all cases, our main findings -not reported here and available on request-remain unchanged.
Our findings contribute to the capital structure adjustment literature and, by providing a rationale for credit crunch phenomena driven by specific governance arrangements, have several policy implications. We show that during the 2002-2010 period covered by the Basel I and II Accords, European banks with and without excess control rights behave differently when they increase Tier 1 regulatory capital to move to their target capital ratios.
Consequently, it is important for regulators and supervisors to consider that imposing more stringent capital requirements, particularly by narrowing the definition of Tier 1 capital to ordinary shares, might impact banks differently depending on their ownership pattern and governance structure. According to our results, banks controlled by a shareholder with divergence between both rights are reluctant to raise equity that may dilute the voting power of ultimate owners. Instead, they rely on internal funds (retained earnings) and slow their lending. Consequently, we presume that their propensity to adjust their Tier 1 capital ratio through alternative methods (reducing dividend payments or shrinking assets and particularly loans or risk-weighted assets) might be higher under Basel III Accords because such banks will be less keen to dilute voting rights by issuing more ordinary shares. In the past, banks could strengthen their Tier 1 capital by issuing preferred shares and other types of hybrid capital that carried only cash-flow rights, but this is not permitted under Basel III. Hence, credit crunch phenomena are more likely to occur in the transition from Basel II to Basel III which is expected to be completed in 2019. A better disclosure of banks' ownership structures following the recommendations of the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BIS, 2010b) should be encouraged to improve regulatory but also market monitoring and discipline. Increasing the level of shareholder protection is also a solution to temper the aversion of controlling shareholders to external recapitalization (equity issues) and to ensure that banks do not refrain from lending to actually contribute to the real economy. Variables definition: All variables are expressed in percentages except Assets which is in millions of Euros and the dummy variable Dividend. Assets=bank's total assets; Loans=ratio of net loans to total assets; NPL=ratio of non-performing loans to gross loans; ROA=return on assets; ROE=return on equity; TotalCapital=risk-based total capital ratio; Tier1TA=ratio of Tier 1 capital to total assets; Tier1RWA=risk-based Tier 1 capital ratio; Dividend=a dummy variable that takes a value of one if the bank pays dividend in a given year, and zero otherwise. Variables definition: Tier1=annual change in Tier 1 capital less current retained earnings/average assets; RetainedEarnings=current net income less current dividend payment/average assets; Assets=annual change in total assets/average assets; Loans=annual change in net loans/average assets; RWA=annual change in risk-weighted assets/average assets; average assets=(total assets t + total assets t-1 )/2; Tier1TA and Tier1RWA are respectively nonrisk-and risk-based Tier 1 capital ratios; kSurplus=absolute value of the gap between the target and the lagged Tier 1 ratios when the bank is above its target, and zero otherwise; ExcessCR=dummy equal to one if control rights are greater than cash-flow rights, and zero otherwise; kDeficit=absolute value of the gap between the target and the lagged Tier 1 ratios when the bank is below its target, and zero otherwise; Deposits=ratio of total customer deposits to total assets; Log(Age)=natural logarithm of bank age; CrossListed=index equal to the number of stock markets on which the bank is listed, and zero if the bank is privately owned; Rescue=dummy equal to one if the bank was rescued during the 2008 financial crisis, and zero otherwise; Merger=dummy equal to one if the bank experienced a merger-acquisition event during the sample period, and zero otherwise; 3MInterbankRate=three months interbank rate; GDPGrowth=real gross domestic product growth rate; StockTraded=value of listed shares to GDP ratio. Country and Year dummies are included but not reported. Hansen test=test of exogeneity of all instruments as a group; AR2 test=second order residual autocorrelation test. P-values based on robust standard errors are shown in parentheses. * , ** and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively. Variables definition: Tier1=annual change in Tier 1 capital less current retained earnings/average assets; RetainedEarnings=current net income less current dividend payment/average assets; Assets=annual change in total assets/average assets; Loans=annual change in net loans/average assets; RWA=annual change in risk-weighted assets/average assets; average assets=(total assets t + total assets t-1 )/2; Tier1TA and Tier1RWA are respectively nonrisk-and risk-based target Tier 1 capital ratios; kSurplus=absolute value of the gap between the target and the lagged Tier 1 ratios when the bank is above its target, and zero otherwise; Family=dummy equal to one if the bank is family-controlled, and zero otherwise; State=dummy equal to one if the bank is state-controlled, and zero otherwise; ExcessCR=dummy equal to one if control rights are greater than cash-flow rights, and zero otherwise; kDeficit=absolute value of the gap between the target and the lagged Tier 1 ratios when the bank is below its target, and zero otherwise. In addition to Family and State dummies, the regressions contain the same control variables as in Table 4 (see their definition in Table A5 in Appendix A). Country and Year dummies are included but not reported. Detailed results are available on request.
Hansen test=test of exogeneity of all instruments as a group; AR2 test=second order residual autocorrelation test. P-values based on robust standard errors are shown in parentheses. * , ** and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively. Variables definition: Tier1=annual change in Tier 1 capital less current retained earnings/average assets; RetainedEarnings=current net income less current dividend payment/average assets; Assets=annual change in total assets/average assets; Loans=annual change in net loans/average assets; RWA=annual change in risk-weighted assets/average assets; average assets=(total assets t + total assets t-1 )/2; Tier1TA and Tier1RWA are respectively nonrisk-and risk-based target Tier 1 capital ratios; kSurplus=absolute value of the gap between the target and the lagged Tier 1 ratios when the bank is above its target, and zero otherwise; ShareRight=dummy equal to one if the shareholder protection index is greater than the median value, and zero otherwise; ExcessCR=dummy equal to one if control rights are greater than cash-flow rights, and zero otherwise; kDeficit=absolute value of the gap between the target and the lagged Tier 1 ratios when the bank is below its target, and zero otherwise. The regressions contain the same control variables as in Table 4 (see their definition in Table A5 in Appendix A). Country and Year dummies are included but not reported. Detailed results are available on request. Hansen test=test of exogeneity of all instruments as a group; AR2 test=second order residual autocorrelation test. P-values based on robust standard errors are shown in parentheses.
* , ** and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively. Variables definition: Tier1=annual change in Tier 1 capital less current retained earnings/average assets; RetainedEarnings=current net income less current dividend payment/average assets; Assets=annual change in total assets/average assets; Loans=annual change in net loans/average assets; RWA=annual change in risk-weighted assets/average assets; average assets=(total assets t + total assets t-1 )/2; Tier1TA and Tier1RWA are respectively nonrisk-and risk-based target Tier 1 capital ratios; kSurplus=absolute value of the gap between the target and the lagged Tier 1 ratios when the bank is above its target, and zero otherwise; Crisis=dummy equal to one if the observation is from 2008 or 2009, and zero otherwise; ExcessCR=dummy equal to one if control rights are greater than cash-flow rights, and zero otherwise; kDeficit=absolute value of the gap between the target and the lagged Tier 1 ratios when the bank is below its target, and zero otherwise. The regressions contain the same control variables as in Table 4 (see their definition in Table A5 
Effects are similar across (i) ownership type and (ii) level of shareholder of protection and hold during normal times.
Effects during distress times:
Effects only hold for: (i) family-controlled banks; (ii) countries with relatively weak shareholder protection; (iii) normal times Otherwise, the effects are like in the absence of excess control rights:
↑, ↓ and → respectively denote an increase, a decrease and a non-significance. Capital adjustment refers to adjustment through capital either externally (equity issue or repurchase) or internally (retained earnings). Assets adjustment include adjustments through total assets (Assets), customer loans (Loans) and risk-weighted assets (RWA). Percent of total assets=percentage of total assets of our sample banks in a given country in the aggregate total assets of all commercial banks provided by Bankscope in the same country over the 2002-2010 period. Variables definition: All variables are expressed in percentages except Assets which is in millions of Euros. Assets=bank's total assets; Deposits=ratio of total customer deposits to total assets; Loans=ratio of net loans to total assets; LoanlossProv=ratio of loan loss provisions to net loans; TotalCapital=risk-based total capital ratio; Tier1TA=nonrisk-based Tier 1 capital ratio; Tier1RWA=risk-based Tier 1 capital ratio; ROA=return on assets; ROE=return on equity. Absolute value of the gap between the fitted target and the lagged actual Tier 1 ratios when the bank is above its target capital ratio, and zero otherwise; the target and the lagged actual Tier 1 ratios are computed based on the nonrisk based Tier 1 ratio (%) Absolute value of the gap between the fitted target and the lagged actual Tier 1 ratios when the bank is below its target capital ratio, and zero otherwise; the target and the lagged actual Tier 1 ratios are computed based on the nonrisk based Tier 1 ratio (%) Subsamples definition: A bank is classified as without excess control rights (ExcessControl=0) if (i) it is controlled by an ultimate owner with equal voting and cash-flow rights, (ii) it is widely held or (iii) if its control chain is a cross-holding. A bank is classified as with excess control rights (ExcessControl>0) if it is controlled by an ultimate owner with greater voting than cash-flow rights.
APPENDIX A
Variables definition: Tier1=annual change in Tier 1 capital less current retained earnings/average assets; RetainedEarnings=current net income less current dividend payment/average assets; Assets=annual change in total assets/average assets; Loans=annual change in net loans/average assets; RWA=annual change in risk-weighted assets/average assets; average assets=(total assets t + total assets t-1 )/2; Tier1TA and Tier1RWA are respectively nonrisk-and risk-based Tier 1 capital ratios; kSurplus=absolute value of the gap between the target and the lagged Tier 1 ratios when the bank is above its target, and zero otherwise; kDeficit=absolute value of the gap between the target and the lagged Tier 1 ratios when the bank is below its target, and zero otherwise. The regressions contain the same control variables (except ExcessCR) as in Variables definition: Tier1=annual change in Tier 1 capital less current retained earnings/average assets; RetainedEarnings=current net income less current dividend payment/average assets; Assets=annual change in total assets/average assets; Loans=annual change in net loans/average assets; RWA=annual change in risk-weighted assets/average assets; average assets=(total assets t + total assets t-1 )/2; Tier1TA and Tier1RWA are respectively nonrisk-and risk-based Tier 1 capital ratios; kSurplus=absolute value of the gap between the target and the lagged Tier 1 ratios when the bank is above its target, and zero otherwise; ExcessCR=dummy equal to one if control rights are greater than cash-flow rights, and zero otherwise; kDeficit=absolute value of the gap between the target and the lagged Tier 1 ratios when the bank is below its target, and zero otherwise. The regressions contain the same control variables as in Table 4 (see their definition in Table A5 in Appendix A). Country and Year dummies are included but not reported. Detailed results are available on request. Hansen test=test of exogeneity of all instruments as a group; AR2 test=second order residual autocorrelation test. P-values based on robust standard errors are shown in parentheses. * , ** and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively. Variables definition: Tier1=annual change in Tier 1 capital less current retained earnings/average assets; RetainedEarnings=current net income less current dividend payment/average assets; Assets=annual change in total assets/average assets; Loans=annual change in net loans/average assets; RWA=annual change in risk-weighted assets/average assets; average assets=(total assets t + total assets t-1 )/2; Tier1TA and Tier1RWA are respectively nonrisk-and risk-based Tier 1 capital ratios; kSurplus=absolute value of the gap between the target and the lagged Tier 1 ratios when the bank is above its target, and zero otherwise; ExcessCR=dummy equal to one if control rights are greater than cash-flow rights, and zero otherwise; kDeficit=absolute value of the gap between the target and the lagged Tier 1 ratios when the bank is below its target, and zero otherwise. The regressions contain the same control variables as in Table 4 (see their definition in Table A5 in Appendix A). Country and Year dummies are included but not reported. Detailed results are available on request. Hansen test=test of exogeneity of all instruments as a group; AR2 test=second order residual autocorrelation test. P-values based on robust standard errors are shown in parentheses. * , ** and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively.
